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CHOICE, INCENTIVE, ill> DISSOMNCE•MEDIATED
ATTI'l'\JDE CHANGE TOWARD A READING ASSIGNMENT

Merlyn S. Swanson
Loyola University of Chicago

The purpose of this stud;y' was to test the effects of' Choice
(whether or not students were given an opportunity to decide w11ether to do the
assignment) and Incentive (whether or not students were promised class credit
for doing the assignment) upon the subsequent attitudes of students toward
doing a reading assignment and upon the students• comprehension of that
reading assignment.

Festinger•s "theory ot cognitive dissonance" was the

theoretical framework from which the experimental hypotheses were developed.
Six hypotheses were stated, consistent Vi.th the following expectations.

It

was expected that the Choice and Incentive variables would show an interaction
in their effects upon students' attitudes toward doing the assignment.

If'

students were given a choice, their attitudes would be more positive when
no incentive was provided than when the incentive was provided.

If students

were not given a choice, tneir attitudes would be more positive vnen the
incentive was provided than when it was not.

It was also expected that

comprehension of' the reading assignment would be positively related to the
incentive variable,

and

that the choice variable would not affect comprehensia •

Eighty Junior higl1 school boys were taken f'rom their sWimming
classes to be tested under the tour experimental conditions:

(1) Choice-

Incentive, (2) Choice-No Incentive, (3) Bo Choice-Incentive, and (4) No
Choice-No Incentive.

Half of the subJects were allowed to decide whether
:

tn\'!Y would do the assignment, and aa.l:f were not.

Half were promised class

credit tor doing the assignment and half were not, depending upon experi-

mental group.
A:t"ter completiDg the assignment, the subjects completed a
rs.ting scale designed to asaesa their attitudes toward doiDg the assignment

and a test ot their comprehension ot the assignment.
The results did not contim all of the experimental hypotheses.
Tne Incentive variable had no significant effect upon either the subjects'
attitudes toward the assignment or their comprehension of the assignment.
The Choice variable had no significant etfect upon the subjects' comprehension of the assignment.

However, a highly significant relations.hip

was found between the Choice variable and the subJects• subsequent attitudes
tows.rd doing the assignment.

Those who were given a choice .r...ad signifi-

cantly more favorable attitudes toward the assignment.
These results, although not as expected, were consistent witi1
dissonance theory.

It was concluded that the promise of class credit was

not an effective incentive.

But giving the subJects a ch'.>ice in the matter

of doing the assignment did result in dissonance-mediated attitude cnange
toward the assignment.

The main practical implication of these findings

was that giving students more opportunities to choose their schoolwork
may

result in more favorable attitudes toward schoolwork.
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CHAPTER I
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Attitude and Reading Assigrunents
From the time a child has learned to read for meaning
until the time he leaves school, reading assigr..ments are recurrent tasks.

Reading assignments ir.ay occur in any subject

area because reading cuts across subject-araa boundaries.
Numerous educational objectives are associated with such assignments.

These objectives may be grouped into three categories.

The first category is made up of subject content objectives.
The goal is reading for the in.forrri.ation contained in the reading
material.

Examples of such objectives might be, "to be aware

of current political issues'' or nto understand the Bill of

Rights.n

The second category is r:iade up of objectives that
relate to the development of reading skills.
of learning to be a better reader.

The goal is that

Examples of such objectives

might be "to increase reading comprehension"

01"" .. t,.4

develop

word recognition skills."
The third category is made up of objectives that
relate to the development of positive attitudes toward reading
activities.

While the first two categories of objectives are

in the cognitive domain, these objectives are in the affective

2.

domain (Krathwohl, Bloom, & Masia, 1964).
to enjoy reading activities.

The goal is to learn

Some examples of such objectives

might be, "to appreciate the value of a reading assignment"
or "to enjoy reading about American history."

Such attitudinal

objectives are very important, and educators are currently
showing greater concern for student attitudes.

After all, how

a student feels about school will af'f ect what he gets out of
school.

How he feels about reading will affect his responses

to reading assignments.

Each school experience carries its

own attitudinal impact, favorable or unfavorable.

These

experiences have a cumulative effect which shapes the student's
total attitude toward school activities.

Thus, it is important

for educators to consider the aff eetive aspect of each assignment.
Despite the importance of affective outcomes, the
systematic study of attitudes is in its infancy (Ammons, 1969).
The present study was motivated by the premise that experimental
investigation of affective outcomes can lead to better understanding, prediction, and control of affective outcomes.

This

understanding will enable educators to provide educational
experiences that are more satisfying to students.

The study

focused upon one particular type of educational experience,
the ubiquitous reading assignment.

The purpose of the study

was to investigate the effects of choice and incentive upon
the subsequent attitudes of students toward a reading assiittlment.

Theoretical Foundations
Theory development is the means by which a behavioral
science increases understanding, prediction, and control.
Theory is the generalization that allows one to explain behavioral phenomena. and it states the relationships by which one

predicts and controls those phenomena (Rescher, 1970).

'l'he

purpose of the present study was intended to be achieved by
extending and improving the theoretical foundations by which one
may understand the affective outcomes of reading assignments.
The theoretical framework tor the study was Festinger'

(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance.

His theory is one of

the more important theories of attitude change.

It also

happens to be well suited for this study because it predicted
attitudinal consequence of choice and incentive variables.
The

study was an attempt to test cognitive dissonance effects

in a practical academic setting.

Parallels to School Practice
The study simulated, as closely as possible, a real

school situation in order to maximize its applicability to
actual school practices, while maintaining enough experimental
control to obtain meaningful results.

The experimental pro-

1'lhile systematically manipulating Choice and Incentive variables,

and then assessing the students' attitudes toward the assignment.
Because comprehension of the reading assignment was also an
important outcome, it was assessed as a second dependent
variable.
School assignments typically require tir.le that the
student would devote to pre.fer.red activities.

To simulate

this condition, the assignment given in this study was completed in school durine swimming class.

All of the subjects

had to give up their sw1mm.ing class in order to do the assign-

ment.

The two experimentally manipulated variables were
choice and incentive.

Both of these variables may be manipu-

lated in making actual school assignments.

A teacher might

give students a choice as to whether or not they would do a

particular assignment, or choice might be given by allo-wi.ng
students to choose £rom alternative assignments.
teacher may provide no choices.

Also, the

In this study the choice

controlled was the students' .freedom to decide whether or not
they would do the assignment.
A teacher might provide incentives to students by

promising class credit or by giving grades.

Actually, grading

might not be an incentive for those students who believe that
they are incapable of obtaining good grades.

Grading might

carry a variety of incentive values for various

st 11 A~n~e.

Thus, course credit

~rould

seem to be a more satisfactory

incentive for experimental purposes.

In this study, incentive

referred to a promise of course credit for doing the assignment.

6.
CHAPTER II
THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
Basic Definitions
Cognitive dissonance is a theoretical construct.

It

is not something that can be directly observed or measured,
but it is a useful concept for predicting and explaining observed
behavior.

Theoretically, it is an intervening variable that

mediates the effects of antecedent conditions upon consequent

events, which in this case are attitude changes.

The need

for such a construct arises when observed attitude changes
do not seem to be directly related to antecedent stimulus
conditions.

Thus, a mediating process is assumed.

To a hard-

nosed scientist, it does not matter whether the mediating
process really exists within the individual.

The important

factor is for the construct to accurately predict behavior.

The

theoretical. construct of cognitive dissonance is useful to the
degree that its occurrence can be determined from objective
antecedent conditions and the extent to which the predicted
attitude changes can be demonstrated as consequent events.
The original statement of the theory of cognitive
dissonance was made by Leon Festinger (1957).
will be summarized in this chapter.
re.f'ers to th

k

His statement

The term ttcognitive"

7.
one holds about one's self or one's environment.

Cognitive

elements, or cognitions, make up one's fund of knowledge.
They represent reality to the individual, corresponding to
what actually exists in the environment and in the individual's
psychological world.

Cognitive elements are "knowledges 0

(Festinger, 1957, Pp. 9).

They are the basic units of attitude

and belief that the individual holds to be valid.
Cognitive elements are not completely independent,
but they may be related to one another in various ways.

For

dissonance theory, three types of relationships are important.
Cognitive elements may be consonant, dissonant, or irrelevant.

If, in the individual's perception, two cognitive
elements have nothing to do with each other, then one cognitive element implies nothing about the other, and their
relationship is said to be ttirrelevant."

For example, the

individual may know that school begins at nine o'clock, and
he also may feel that eighteen-year-olds should be allowed
to vote.

These two elements of cognition have nothing to

do with each other.

Thus, they have an irrelevant relation

to each other.
Two cognitive elements are relevant to one another if

one implies something about the other.

According to Festinger

(1957, Pp. 18), if two cognitive elements are relevant, their
relation must be either consonant or dissonant.

Two cognitive

elements are said to be "consonanttt if, given one element,

8.
the other may be expected to follow.
seem consistent to the individual.

That is, the two elements
For example, one may know

that the weather forecast calls f'or rain and that he brought
his umbrella with him.

These two cognitive elements have a

consonant relationship.
Two cognitive elements are said to be "dissonantu if',

given one element, the other may be expected not to follow.
That is, the two elements seem inconsistent to the individual.
Festinger (1957, Pp. 1.3) stated it this way:

"These two

elements are in a dissonant relation ii', considering these
two alone, the obverse oi' one element would follow from the

other."

For example, an individual may know that his grade

is precariously low in math, and yet he may choose to go out

rather than doing his math assignment.

These two cognitive

elements have a dissonant relationship.
Dissonance may be better understood by reviewing the
sources from which Festinger (1957, Pp. 14) suggests it may
arise.

(l) Dissonance might arise from logical inconsistency.

For example, an individual might believe that he will receive
an "A" in history, and he may feel that he is incapable of
passing the final exam in that course.
are not logically consistent.
cultural mor~s.

The two cognitions

(2) Dissonance might arise from

For example> an individual may know that he

cheated on a civics exam, and he may understand that such
cheating is morally wrong.

His behavior is inconsistent with

9.
what he knows he should do.

(3) Dissonance might arise from

a specific opinion which, by definition, is included in a
more general opinion.

For example, an individual may be a

supporting member of a liberal student organization, and he
may be in favor of consorship of campus speakers.

The latter

opinion is inconsistent with the more general opinion.

(4) Dissonance might arise from past experience.

For example,

an individual might receive a failing grade on his final
report, and he might recall that he passed all of the assignments and tests in that course.

His present experience is

inconsistent with his past experiences.
Basic Principles
The fundamental assumption upon which the theory of
cognitive dissonance is based is that there is a pressure
within the individual to produce consonant relationships
among cognitions and to avoid and reduce dissonant relationships.

The focus of dissonance theory is upon the hypotheti-

cal condition ttcognitive dissonanee 11 which arises when cognitive

elements are in a dissonant relationship.

The theory states

that the existence of dissonance creates psychological tension
or discomfort which will motivate the individual to reduce
the dissonance and to avoid further dissonance.

The basic

postulate of the theory is that the existence of dissonance is

10.
a drive state which motivates the individual to reduce the
dissonance and to achieve consonance or consistency in his
cognitions.

The theory deals with relations between pairs 0£
cognitive elements.

It is recognized that there may be many

additional elements 0£ cognitiDn that are consonant with

either of the two elements under consideration.

But the

two-element simplification is sufficient for the theory.
It is also recognized that dissonance may exist in
varying degrees,
dissonance.

Two factors determine the magnitude of

The magnitude of dissonance will increase as a

function of the importance of the dissonant elements to the

individual,

It will also depend upon the proportion of

relevant elements that are dissonant with the one in question,
Thus Festinger (1957, Pp. 18) states that the total amount of
dissonance that exists between two clusters of cognitive
elements will be a function of the proportion of all relevant
relations between the dissonant clusters of elements when
the clusters are waighted according to their importance.
Dissonance Reduction
Cognitive dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce
the dissonance, and the strength of those pressures is a
function of the magnitude of the dissonance.

The drive to

ll.

reduce dissonance may result in various nodes of dissonance
reduction.

In general, dissonance reduction is achieved by

changing one of the dissonant elements.
One mode of dissonance reduction is changing a behavior
al cognitive element.

For example, if an individual starts

out for a picnic and it begins to rain 1 he may reduce the
dissonance between going on a picnic and knowing that it is
raining by

goi..~g

back home.

Another mode of dissonance reduction is changing an
environmental element.

For example, if an individual who

seems likely to become president of an organization feels

inadequate for that position, he may reduce the dissonance
between the likelihood of becoming president and his feelings
of inadequacy by throwing his support over to another candidate.
Another mode of dissonance reduction is adding new
cognitive elements or changing existing ones.

For example,

if an individual who smokes believes that smoking is hazardous

to his health, he may reduce the dissonance between smoking
and the heal th hazard by deciding that stopping &'1loking would

result in an unhealthy gain in weight or by minimizing his
confidence in the smoking research.
One cannot readily predict from dissonance theory
which mode of dissonance reduction .an individual will employ.
According to Festinger (1957, Pp. 24), cognitive elements have

12.
varying degrees of resistance to change.

It r::ay be extrECely

difficult for an individual who is ''in contact with reality 0
to deny the mer:;ory of his behavior or to change his perception

of

somethin~

concrete in his environment.

and attitudes may be more

susce~tible

However, opinions

to change.

Theoretically.

the individual who is sui"ficiently motivated to reduce disaonance
will change the ele;jent that is least resistent to change.

In dissorumce research, the experhlenter will,
typieally, block all "lt.ernative modes of dissonance reduction
except

tor ·tho cognition that is to be changed.

Dissor.tance

is experimentally cr.ated in order to motivate the individual
to change that particular cognitive element.

T'nat change

is measured as evidence for the existence of the cognitive
dissonance.

For example, college men who were opposed to

the draft were induced to make up a tape recorded speech in
support of the draft.

A control group of college m.en were

asked to read pro-draft material into a tape :recorder.

The

attitudes of the two groups were measured bafore and after
they gave their speeches or read the material.

It waa found

that the group that rr.ade up pro-draft speeches changed their
opinions toward the dratt more than the control group
(Featinger, 1957, Pp. 104).

13.

CHAPTER III
DEVELQPf,;ENTS IN DISSONANCE THEORY

Proposed Modifications of the Theory
Festinger's initial statement of the theory of
~ognitive

dissonance was followed by a flurry of critical

.nvestigation.

Initially, the research activity was preoccupied

Id.th validation of the theory.

or revisions have been proposed.

~ations
~ave

These modifications

been proposed by investigators who accepted dissonance

~heory
~he

As a result a number of modif'i-

in general, but who felt that some revision would improve

correspondence between the theory and the data to which it

lpplied.

Generally, the proposed modifications specify limiting

:onditions within which the theory is valid.

The data that

)rompted the suggested revisions will not be reviewed here.
Brehm and Cohen (1962) proposed that commitment was
m essential factor in dissonance theory.

They discussed the

·elation of dissonance theory to conflict theories and reported
several studies, building a case f".)r their suggested revision.
3rehm and Cohen took the position that if a person makes a
iecision without commitment, he is free to change his mind, and
~ould

experience no dissonance.

To the degree that the indivi-

iual chooses to make a particular commitment, he must live with

lis decision.

Thus the opportunity for the dissonance state

0£ psychological diacomf ort exists because of the corunitrnent to

the inconsistent elai:1ent rather than because of the existence
of the inconsistent element.
Featinger (1964) took into account the modifications

which Brehm and Cohen suggested in describing aor:ie modifications of his own.

His second book on cognitive dissonance was

exclusively ,;oncerned with dissonance as it relates to

decision rr.aking.

Festinger accepted the notion of Brehm and

Cohen that cormlitment was necessary in order for dissonance to

occur.

However• ha enlarged the concept of corr.rd t.ment to

include not only situations in which an individual chooses

to take a public stand, but any situation in which the
decision unequivocally affects subsequent behavior.

In other

words, the commitnumt nect not be overt, but r..ay be implied by

the individual's behavior.

Festinger also indicated that the

amount of dissonance that exists after a decision has been
nade is a direct function of the number of things a person

knows that are inconsistent with that particular decision.
The more difficulty or conflict the person has experienced
in making the decision, the greater would be the amount of
dissonance generated and the tendency to justify that decision

afterwards.

Dissonance reduction following a decision would

take the forr:i ot increasing the attractiveness of the rejected
alternative.

Thus, following a decision, a cognitive process

occurs that acconplishes a spreading apart of the attractiveness

15.
of the alternatives available to the decision maker.

For

example, girls were given infonnation about two hypothetical
applicants for the position of vice president of a company.
A~er

choosing one of the applicants, the girls tended to

enhance the qualities of the chosen applicant as compared to
the qualities of the unchosen applicant (Festinger, 1964,
Pp. 12-15).

Greenpole (1968) felt that when you strip down
dissonance theory, it can be stated in a simple mathematical
formulation.
factors.

Cognitive dissonance is generated by two

The first factor is "post decision inconsistency"

which is the amount of information that the individual has

that is inconsistent with the decision he has made.

The

second factor is "decision importance" which is simply the
subjective importance of the decision to the individual.
These two factors should summate to determine the amount of
dissonance experienced by the individual.
suggestion

~hat

Greenpole's

decision is essential for dissonance to be

generated seems similar to the idea that commitment is a
necessary precondition.
Aronson (196$) discussed the importance of individual
differences in relation to dissonance theory, and he suggested
that self-concept is a major factor in dissonance theory.
According to Aronson, the source of dissonance is inconsistency
between cognitions and self-concept.

Dissonance occurs when

16.
a person behaves in a manner that is inconsistent with his
views of himself as a person.

This proposed modification

restricts the applicability of dissonance theory considerably.
Dissonance theory would not apply to situations in which the
individual has inconsistent cognitions about the external
environment.

It would only apply to situations in which one

of the inconsistent cognitions relates to the individual's

self-concept.
Bramel {1968) similarly emphasized the individual
in relation to dissonance theory.

He did not agree with

Aronson that the individual's self-concept must be directly
involved in the dissonance.

Bramel felt that the individual's

self-concept need be only indirectly involved.

He stated

that dissonance arises when (1) the individual encounters
information that disconfirms an expectation, or {2} when he
discovers that he has chosen

inco~petently

or immorally.

Dissonance is "a type of anxiety" which is a feeling of personal unworthiness.
Zimbardo (1969) related dissonance theory to
instrumental behavior theory.

His concern was not with the

conditions under which dissonance is generated but with the
factors that determine the amount of dissonance generated.

He stated that dissonance will be greater as (1) the perceived
freedom of choice increases, (2} the initial drive level
increases, (3) the severity of anticipated future deprivation

or stimulation increases, and (4) the incentive for justification of
decreases.

com.~itment

to deprivation or excessive stimulation

The measurement of differential amountsof dissonance

is far from precise.

Further research will be required to

refine both theory and methodology regarding the differential
measurement of dissonance.
Criticisms of the Theory
Soma authors have been particularly critical of the
theory of cognitive dissonance.

They have said that the

theory is inadequate or unnecessary.
described the situation.

!·icGuire (1966, Pp. 492)

trover the past three years,

dissonance theory continued to generate more research and
more hostility than any other one approach."

The strongest criticism was the critical review by
Chapanis & Chapanis (1964).

These authors criticized the

theory on the basis that it was too simple to account for
"the essentials of a complex social situation."

They also

criticized the eA1Jerimental validation of the theory on two
bases.

First, they felt that no valid conclusions could be

drawn from cognitive dissonance research because the experimental manipulations were too complex and the crucial variables
too confounded.

Second, they noted a number of methodological

problems among the research studies.

There have been a nunber of replies to Chapanis and
Chapanis' criticisns.

Kiesler, Collins, and

T~iller

(1969)

replied that Chapanis and Chapanis were r:iisled hy the
simplicity of Festinger's hypothesis.

Festinger emphasized

a two-element simplification for research purposes, but this
two-element simplification was not intended to represent the
coraplexity of a real social situation.

Chapanis and Chapanis

also failed to take into account some important factors in
their evaluation of the theory, such as the amount of data
that has been accounted for by the theory.

Criticisms on

the basis that the theory departs .from cuatonary views of
behavior are unjustified.

Silverman (1964) also replied to

Chapanis and Chapanis' criticisms.

He stated that, while

Chapanis and Chapanis criticized dissonance theory, they did
not present any satisfactory alternative explanation for the
findings.

Also, many of the "methodological inadequacies"

were acceptable experimental procedures.
Rosenberg has been an outspoken critic of dissonance
theory.

His first criticism (Rosenberg, 1965) was published

at the same time as a criticism by Janis and Gilmore (1965),
and the two articles were renarkably parallel.

Both said

that some dissonance data could be accounted for by experimental contaminants, and both presented a study- to support
their positions.
by

One contaminant called Haffect arrousal 11

Rosenberg was similar to what Janis and Gilmore called

19.
"biased scanning."

Their notions were that experiments on

counter-attitudinal advocacy predisposed subjects to think
of all the arguments they could in order to justify what
they were doing.

The larger the incentive, the greater would

be the subject's motivation to think up such arguments.
However, if the incentive were too big, it would cause suspicion and fear of being exploited.

Thus there would be a

negative incentive effect (Janis & Gilmore, 1965).

"Evalua-

tion apprehension", which is a desire to show the experimenter
that one cannot be bribed, may also account for negative
incentive effects (Rosenberg, 1965).

These arguments have

led to considerable debate as to whether dissonance effects
can be explained on the basis of experimental contaminants
(Rosenberg, l966a & 19661:;.

Some review authors have shown

that there is considerable support for dissonance theory in
studies that have eliminated alleged sources of contamination
(Aronson, 1966; Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969).
Bem (l967a & l967b) has proposed another interpretation of dissonance data based upon "self-perception."
According to his argument, an individual observes his own
behavior and interprets his own internal status in terms of
what he sees himself doing.

Thus, if an experimenter can

induce a subject to behave in some manner that is contrary
to the subject's attitudes, that subject will reinterpret
his attitude in terms of his behavior.

Subjects who comply

20.

with an experinent for a large reward are less likely to believe
that their behavior reflects their true attitudes than subjects
who

comply for a sr:iall reward.

:Mills (1967) and others have

pointed out that this alternative explanation could apply to
only a small portion of the dissonance studies, and so it is

less satisfactory than the dissonance explanation.
Other criticisms of dissonance theory will be mentioned
in the next sectioni but those summarized in this section
have been the major attacks upon the theory.
done mortal damage to the theory.

They have not

In fact, they have probably

stimulated a considerable amount of supportive research.
Current Status
Examination of the literature leads to the conclusion
that the theory of cognitive dissonance has been one of the
most controversial and influential theories in
attitude change.

t~a

area of

Almost all of the research has been theory

oriented, and cognitive dissonance has been essentially a
laboratory phenomenon.

There have been very few attempts to

demonstrate cognitive dissonance effects outside of the
laboratory.

The many criticisms of the theory have not

produced satisfactory alternative explanations for cognitive
dissonance data.
and modifications.

However, they have resulted in refinement
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Recent reviews (Aronson, 1963; Kiesler, Collins, &
fe~iller,

1969; Shaw &. Kostanzo, 1970) note that dissonance

theory has continued to gain importance and scientific
rrespectability 1••

1'hese same authors have noted some problems

in the current status of the theory which -vdll require addi-

tional attention.

The most frequently mentioned problern is

that of ambiguity in the definitions of cognitive dissonance

concepts.

For example, Pepitone (1966) noted that it is

essentially impossible to specify what is a "cognitive element".
Neither can one clearly specify l>!hen one cognition is
':psychologically obverse" in its relationship to another.
Perhaps what is psychologically inconsistent to one individual
will not be to another.
Another problem is that of specifying just when and
how dissonance reduction behavior will occur.

There are

apparently varying degrees of cognitive dissonance, and the
theory does not perr.iit neasure..inent of dissonance other than
on an ordinal scale.

When dissonance is present, more than

one mode of dissonance reduction may be available to the
individual.

The theory does not provide a clear means for

determining which mode of dissonance reduction will be employed.

Typically, experimenters have found it necessary to

block all but one avenue for dissonance reduction.

Finally, the need for several revisions to the theory
which have already been discussed suggests that the theory,
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in its currant form, does not su.fficiently predict all of the
data.
~1a.s

In its simplicity, the theory of cognitive dissonance

failed to recognize several important variables.

Some

of these variables hava been identified and may be incorporated
into the theory at some future time.
In. sumuia.tion, the theory of cognitive dissonance has
proved its value in predicting attitude change.

It is far

frora per.feet, but it has been widergoing a refinement process.
Judgine from. the literature, there is consiaerable current

interest in dissonance theory.

It is expected that additional

refinenent will be made in the future, and that the theory

of cognitive dissonance will becon1e an increasingly use£ul
tool for understanding hum.an attitude changes.

23.
CHAPTER

r.J

THE EFFECTS OF CHOICE AND INCENTIVE
IN DISSONANCE RESEARCH

Choice as an Independent Variable
Choice is a central factor in dissonance theory
(Aronson, 1966).

The literature more frequently refers to

"decision", but the term "decision" implies that there has
been a choice (Greenwald, 1968). Many of the studies of
cognitive dissonance have used choice as an independent variable.
This was the subject of Festinger's 1964 work.

The amount of

dissonance that results from a choice or decision was described
as a direct function or the number of cognitions the individual
has that are inconsistent with the choice or decision.

The

dissonance is manifest by a tendency to justify the decision
after it has been made.

Justification is a dissonance-reduction

mechanism which may be accomplished by increasing the attractiveness of the chosen alternative or by subjective1y
decreasing the attractiveness of the rejected alternative
(Festinger, 1964).
Considerable support for this postulate may be found
outside of Festinger' s own works.

One type of supporting

evidence comes from studies employing the "forced compliance
paradigm" which has to do 'With the situa1;ion in which the

to his beliefs or attitudes.

Subjects who have chosen to comply

with experimenters' requests that they take a public stand in
opposition to their private belief tended to see their counterattitudinal position as more attractive (Rabbie, et. al., 1959;
Kiesler & DeSalvo, 1967; Kiesler, Pallak, & Kanouse, 1968).
Similarly, subjects who have been induced to do an unpleasant
task have tended to see that task as more pleasant {Brehm, 1959;
Brehm, 1960; Cook, 1969; Helmreich, 1968).
Another type of supporting evidence comes from studies
in which changes in individuals' attitudes toward choice
alternatives have been measured after the individual has made
a choice.

Subjects' attitudes toward chosen appliances

(Brehm, 1956), toys (Brehm & Cohen, 1959), and job candidates
(Penner, Fitch, & Weik, 1966) shifted to favor the chosen
alternative after the decision had been made.

Gerard {l967a)

showed that the amount of attitude change due to dissonance
was greater under conditions of high dissonance (when the
alternatives were close in value) than under conditions of
low dissonance (when alternatives were disparate in value).
A third type of supporting evidence is more closely
related to the proposed study.

Studies in which the freedom

of choice was the independent variable have shown that under
conditions of greater choice, more dissonance results than
under conditions of less freedom of choice.

Subjects who

read a negative evaluation to another person changed their

opinion of that person more negatively under Choice conditions
than lro Choice conditions (Davis

& Jones, 1960).

Subjects who

wrote counter-attitudinal essays on "Why I Would Like to Become
a Catholic" showed more pro-Catholic attitude change under
Choice conditions than under No Choice conditions (Brock, 1962).
Subjects who

ad~inistered

shock to others minimized the shock

more under Choice than No Choice conditions (Brock & Buss, 1962).
Subjects who performed a boring task minimized the boredom of
the task more under Choice conditions thanuider No Choice
conditions (Ryterband, & King, 1966).

The recently published

book by Zimbardo (1969) contains a number of studies employing

choice as an independent variable.

Some factorial studies

using choice conditions as one of the variables will be discussed later.
A problem arises with the choice variable because there
are degrees of freedom of choice.

The greater the freedom of

choice allowed, the more subjects the experimenter is likely

to lose.

This loss of subjects is undesirable.

The less the

freedom of choice allowed: the less will be the difference
between the Choice and No Choice conditions and the power of
the experimental test.

This loss of power is undesirable.

Some studies employing Choice-No Choice conditions

lose subjects from the Choice condition.

According to Zimbardo

(1969), the validity of the Choice condition must be questioned
if subjects do not refuse to submit to the experiment.

is
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loss of refusing subjects is common in dissonance research, and
it has been criticized as introducing bias in the subject selec-

tion.

Zimbardo argued that bias could enter only if those who

refused had lower thresholds for the relevant stimulation about
which judgements were to be made.

He showed that the refusing

subjects were not affected any differently by food deprivation,
dislike for eating grasshoppers, thirst, pain, and other
stimulation about which judgements were to be made as the
dependent variables in his research.
It is difficult to have a Choice condition without
ru.."Uling the danger of losing subjects.

Some investigators

such as Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967) have used just
enough inducement to assure that no subjects would be lost.
However, this procedure reduces the freedom of choice and,
with it, the difference between the Choice and No Choice
conditions.

In the current study, a real choice was offered

to those subjects in the Choice condition, thus allowing them
to refuse to participate.

Incentive as an Independent Variable
Another important independent variable in dissonance
research is incentive.

'I'he term "incentive" has become

standard in dissonance research, although this variable has
also been called payment, reward, reinforcement value, etc.
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The

a~ount

cf dissonance that results from a decision depends,

in part, upon the ar::ount of incentive given to select the
chosen alternative.

Individuals who make a choice with High

Incentive for making that particular choice will experience

less dissonance than individuals t.mo ma.lee a choice under Low
Incentive conditions {La,'lrence & Festinger, 1962).

The dynamics

of the incentive variable are that individuals who have less
incentive for ma.king a decision have less justification for
making that decision, and thus, experience more dissonance
following the decision.

There is considerable experimental

support for this postulate in addition to the studies described
in La:wre..11ce and Fe stinger's work.
Mills (1958) found that children \mo cheated with
Low Inc3ntive (toy value) changed their attitude to become

more lenient toward cheating than children who cheated with
High

Incen~ive.

However, those who did not cheat with Low

Incentive becane more severe in their attitudes.

Festinger

and Carlsmith (1959) fowid that subjects in a Low Incentive
($1) group who did a boring task tended to minir:iize the
boredom

or

the task and had more favorable attitudes than did

a High Incentive ($20) group.

Students ·who felt overpaid on

an hourly rate for doing an interviewing task produced more
than those who felt equitably paid.

But 11l1en students .felt

overpaid on a piecework basis, their productivity was less
thai."1 when they felt equitably paid (Adams &. Rosenbaum, 1962).

BreJ:1.m (1962} showed that subjects wi10 committed thenselves to

food or water deprivation rated themselves as less hungry or
thirsty when paid $1 than when paid $5.

Students who were

induced to write an essay supporting an idea with ·which they
disagreed changed their opinion more under a Low Incentive
(pa;~1ent)

condition than under a High Incentive condition

(Gerard, l967b).

Students who were u.viderraid (10¢) for doing

an interviewing job tended to see the jct as more interesting

than students who were equitably (25¢) pa.id (Lawler & O'Gara,
1967}.

When

co1n.~tted

to make a statement against their own

beliefs, students in the Low Incentive ($ .50) condition
showed more attitude change than students in the High Incentive

($2.50) condition (Helmreich & Collins, 1968).
The incentives employed in a school are seldom monetary.
' They are usually ttgrades" or "creditn.

No cognitive dissonance

studies have been found that eri1ployed grades as incentives.
One experiment used grades to vary the importance ot the
subjects' decisions, but the way that the grades were used
did not apply to the incentive variable (Mills, et. al., 1959).

Only one study has bean found that employed class credit as
an incentive {Holmes & Strickland, 1970).

The effects of the

class credit variable were similar to those found in other
studies employing monetary incentives.

That study will be

described later in this chapter.
The timing of the incentive is a critical factor in
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dissona.."lce research.

This fact vra.s discovered when Rosenberg

(1965) failed ·t;o find dissonance effects under certain temporal

conditions.

Subsequently, the effects of timing have been

further studied and are better understood.

Linder, Cooper,

and Jones (1967) reported two studies in which students were
asked to write counter-attitudinal essays under Choice and

No Choice conditions and High ($2.50) and Low ($
Incentive conditions.

.;o)

Subjects were info:rr1ed about the in-

centive either before or after making their decisions.

The

inverse relationship between incentive and attitude change
occurred only \'t'hen the subjects were informed about the
incentive before making their decisions whether or not to
coniply tlith the experiment.

W'nen they were inf'ormed about

the incentiva after making their decisions, a direct relationship was obtained.

Rossomando and Weiss (1970) al.so assessed

the influe:iee of tit'ling of the incentive variable.

$1.;o
favor or

Students

were told that they would receive

or $5.00 for writing

a countar-attitudinal essay in

raising tuition.

The

inverse relation between incentive and attitude change was
found only when the subjects were paid after the measurement
of' attitude change wa3 ma.de.

When the subjects were paid

before measuring attitude change, a direct relationship was
found.
Two additional studies might easily be confused as

applying to this same incentive-time interaction, but they do

JO.
not.

Hel.wreich (1968) fow1d an interaction between a:nourit of

jus-c;i.fication an<i the timillb of the justification.

Justifi-

cation has not beer. equated to incentive, and shouJ.d not be
confused with the incentive variable.
time-incentive interaction.

Cook (1969) iound a

However, the time variable was

not the timing of the incentive, but the timing of the
attitude assesSitent.
The current study did not employ the kind of monetary
rewards that have served as incentives for most dissonance
studies.

Rather, course credit was promised as an incentive.

Whether course credit would be equivalent to monetary relm.rds

was not known, but it is the kind of incentive most frequently
used in schools.

'l'he hypotheses assumed that the two kinds

of incentives would have equivalent effects.
No time variable was included in tiie study.

The

experiu1ental p1,ocedure took into account the effects of

timing upon the relationship between incentive and attitude
change so that the effects of the incentive .-rould not be
negated by improper timing.

The subjects were ir..fon:ied o!

the incentive before deciding whether to comply, and the
incentive object (course credit) was not given before the
attitude change measurement.
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Choice .x Inee:ntive Interaction

Three recent dissonance studies have varied both
choice and incenti"1e conditions with similar results.

When

subjects were given-freedore of choosing whether to comply,
incentive size has been inversely related to attitude change.
But when subjects were given no choice, incentive size has
been directly related to attitude change.
a.~d

Jones (1967) found

thes~

tinder, Cooper,

relationships in an experiment

in which students "l.rere asked to irJrite a counter-attitudinal

essay advocating a ban on college speakers.
were $

.;o

a,,."ld $2.50.

The ineentives

Holmes and Strickland (1970) employed

three incenti7e conditions in ·which students were told that
they would receive zero, 0ne, or two hours of experiment
credit for their psycholoBY class.

Half of the subjects were

given a choice as to whether or not they would participate,
and half were given no choice.

A pre-test showed that the

attitudes of the volunteers and the
different.

non-volunta~rs

ware not

The subjects wrote a counter-attitudinal essay

on student involvement in university affairs.

In the Choice

condition, attitude change wa:3 inversely related to incentive.
But in the No Choice condition, attitude change was directly
related to

ineenti~;e.

Sherman {1970) did a similar experiment

in which students were paid $

.;o

or $2.50 for writing a

counter-attitudinal essay against instituting a week-long

)2.

reading period.

In the Choice condition, attitude change was

inversely related to incentive.

But in the No Choice condition,

a positive relationship wae found.
In the three studies reported above a similar interaction between Choice and Incentive conditions was found.
When the subjects were given an opportwlity to choose whether
or not to participate, dissonance was created because they
had chosen to perform a somewhat disagreeable task.

Dissonance

theory predicted that cognitive dissonance would be greater
the smaller the incentive because greater incentive would
provide greater justification for making the affirmative choice.
Thus attitude change would be greater as the incentive was
decreased, yielding an inverse relationship between incentive
and attitude change.

When the subjects were given no oppor-

tunity to choose whether or not to participate, dissonance
was not created by choosing to do a disagreeable task.

Under

the No Choice condition. greater incentive tended to result in
greater attitude change, yielding a direct relationship
between incentive and attitude change.
For this study, an interaction between choice and
incentive effects upon dissonance-mediated attitude change
was predicted.

The hypotheses for the study were consistent

with the findings of the studies reported above.

Effects of Choice and Incentive Conditions
Dissonance research is generally concerned with
attitude change.

Cognitive dissonance brings about a readiness

to perceive certain stimulus conditions in dissonance-reducing
ways.

The specific attitude change that occurs depends upon

the nature of the experiment, and several types of changes
have been shown to result from the freedom of choice variable.
Subjects who have written counter-attitudinal essays have
changed their attitudes more in the direction of their written
statements under the choice condition than under the No
Choice condition, except when incentives W'ere added to the
experimental procedure (Brock, 1962; Linder, Cooper, & Jones,
1967; Holmes,

&

Strickland, 1970; Sherman, 1970). Subjects

who have read a negative evaluation to a person had more
negative attitude change under the Choice condition than under
the No Choice condition (Davis & Jones, 1960).

Subjects who

administered shocks to another person minimized the painfulness of the shock more under the Choice condition than under
the No Choice condition (Brock & Buss, 1962).

Subjects who

engaged in boring tasks had more positive attitudes toward
the tasks under the Choice condition than under the No Choice
condition (Brehm & Cohen, 1959; Ryterband & King, 1966).
The present study predicted that Choice and No Choice
conditions would affect dissonance-mediated attitude change
.,,,..... . . >_ ....

··~~-

·----·-··

~

....

toward an assigned reading task.

Thus, attitude toward the

reading task was one of the dependent variables.

mance variable, comprehension
the other dependent variable.

or

A perfor-

the reading material, was

High and Low choice conditions

have not been shown to affect such a performance variable.
Thus, it was predicted that the choice condition would not
affect comprehension of the reading material.
The incentive variable has been shown to be an important variable in studies of
change.

dissona..~ce-mediated

attitude

The specific effects of incentive depend upon the

nature of the experir11e11t.

Subjects who advocated. a counter-

attitudina1 idea in an essay or verbal statement changed
their opinion to

confor~

more closely to the one expressed

under Low Incentive conditions than under High Incentive
conditions, except when they were not allowed freedom of
choice (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Gerard, 1967; Linder,
Cooper & Jones, 1967; Helmreich & Collins, 1968; Holmes &
Strickland, 1970; Rossomando & Weiss, 1970).

The greater the

incentive to cheat, the more severe became the attitudes of
children who resisted temptation and the more lenient became
the attitudes of those who cheated

(~tt.lls,

1958).

The

smaller the monetary incentive for food or water deprivation,
the more subjects minimized their hunger or thirst (Brehm,
1962).

The greater the payment, the more negative were the

eventual attitudes of subjects toward a dull proofreading task.

But measures of perfornance did not vary significantly (Cook,
1969).

Subjects paid by the hour produced more when they per-

ceived their pay as inequitably large.

But when paid on a

piecework basis, ·they produced less when they perceived their

pay as inequitably large (Ada.ms & Rosenbaw:1, 1962).

Subjects

who were paid an inequitably low wage tended to see their
intervie~dng

jobs as nore interesting and less important than

did better paid subjects.

They also produced more interviews,

but the interviews were poorer in quality (Lawler & O'Gara,
1967).

The current study predicted that incentive conditions
would affect dissonance-mediated attitude change toward an
assigned reading task.

That is, the measured attitudes of

the subjects to-wa.rd the task would show an interaction between
Choice and Incentive conditions.

Under the High Choice condi-

tion, the subjects' attitudes toward doing the res.ding assignment
would be directly related to the amount of incentive provided.
Under the No Choice condition, the subjects' attitudes toward
doirig the assigru!lent would be inversely related to the an1ount
of incentive provided.
Some studies have shown effects of incentive conditions
upon performance measures, but there has not been consistency
in the Jr..ind of perfor.:nance for l"Jhich the incentive ·was given.
Cognitive dissonance, or attitude change resulting .from
dissofl.ance, has not been shown to i'.1ave any syste>atic affect
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upon perforn1a.:nce measures.

Thus the present study predicted

that the Incentive conditions would af£ect performance on the
reading task, but, Choice conditions would not.

The subjects'

comprehension of the reading assignment would be directly
related to the aoount of incentive provided, irregardless of
Choice condition.
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CHAPTER V
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT STUDY

Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted as part of the development
procedure for the current study.

The pilot study employed

only·one independent variable, a Choice and No Choice variable.
No incentive variable was employed.
variables.

There were two dependent

One was the subjects' judgements regarding the

difficulty of the reading assignment, and the other was the
subjects' comprehension of what they had read.

Dissonance

was varied by manipulating the choice conditions.

Two

hypotheses were tested relating dissonance effects to each of
the two dependent variables.
(l)

Subjects who perceive that they have had a choice
in the matter of reading difficult material will
perceive that material as lese difficult than
subjects who have been given no choice.

(2)

Subjects who perceive that they have had a choice
in the matter of reading difficult material will
comprehend that material better than subjects
who have been given no choice.

The subjects were randomly drawn from two fifth grade
classes in an
community.

el~~cntary

school located in a niddle-class

The subjects were divided into two groups, with ten

students in each group.

The two groups were matched on the

basis of sex and reading comprehension scores.

Scores obtained

on the Iowa Silent Reading Test were used for matching purposes.
Table l shows the data upon which the two groups were matched.
The reading material used for this pilot study was
the story part of the Traxler High School Reading Test.
At the end of the story, two questions were typed in order
to r:ieasure the subjects' estimation of the difficulty of

the reading material.

Twenty comprehension questions about

the reading material were reproduced separately.

These

questions were given to the subjects after they had finished
the reading and had completed the two questions about its

difficulty.

Thus the comprehension questions could not

influence the subjects' judgement about the difficulty of
the reading material.

T'nese materials may be seen in

Appendix A.
The two groups were tested during their regular school

classes.

The No Choice g.-roup 'Was given the Ko Choice in-

structions in 'Which they were simply told that they would do
a difficult reading task.

The Choice group was given Choice

instructions in which they were allowed to decide whether
or not to read the material.

These instructions follow.
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TADLE l

DATA UPON WHICH GROUPS WBRE MATCHED
FOR THE PILOT STUDY•

CHOICE GROUP
Iowa
Score

Subject

Uumber

NO CHOICE GROUP

Sex

Iowa
Score

Subject

Sex

fl umber
~-llil''I'

A!ll'l~- ... -

-10.2

•••

l

F

10.0

ll

2

M

8.6

12

,

3

F

13

M

4

...'"~

8.l
?.l
6.S

14

M
F

6.)

15
16

,

7.9
1.0
6.3
6.S

,

s

F

8.6

6

,

7

F

6.0

17

F

6.o

8

M

6.0

18

F

6.0

9

M

t·

;)

19

M

5.5

s.2

20

M

s.o

,

10

.)

.

1"'

_.......,..~--.....__,.,.--~--~-

i Male
Female

?•iea.n: 6.94
S.D.: 1.)7

--

* Iowa

"

~

i v.ie
Female

Tests of Basic Skills, Reading Teet

~,'it..,.

Mean: 6.92

S.D.: 1.46

.

~-

•1>1•1111•"

'¢

--~

I am here to find out just how well fifth
graders can do on a difficult reading task.
In order to determine this, I have a story
here for you to read. When you get this
story, you simply read it at a natural
speed. At the end of the story you will
find two questions. After you have read
the story and answered the two questions,
raise your hand, and I'll come to your
desk and give you another sheet with some
more questions on it.
(For the Choice condition only.) Now I
don't want anyone to feel like he has been
forced to do this. Whether or not you take
part in this experiment is up to you. So
I'm going to pass out some slips of paper.
Just take one slip, put your name on it,
and indicate whether you will take part.
If you mark yes, of course, I'll give you
the reading. But if' you mark no, just
remain at your seat and work quietly.
According to the first hypothesis, the subjects in
the Choice condition should have perceived the reading
material as more dif'ficult than subjects in the No Choice
condition.

Responses to the two questions designed to

measure perceived difficulty failed to confirm this prediction.

Chi Square analysis indicated that the differences

between the groups were not significant.
According to the second hypothesis, the subjects in
the choice condition should have comprehended the reading
material better than those in the No Choice condition.
data did not support this prediction either.

The

The mean raw

score for the Choice group was 10.1 with a standard deviation

4.]..

2.86.

The difference between these means obtained a t value

of 1.89 which was not significant.

Table 2 shows the compre-

hension data.
Discussions with the students following the experiment
led to some conclusions about the experiment.

First, the

measure of estimated reading difficulty was not successful.
The questions designed to measure estimated difficulty level
did not discriminate well because almost all of the subjects
chose the sazne response.

Secondly, the comments of the

subjects suggested that their judgements regarding the
difficulty of the reading material may not have been influenced by the experimental conditions.

However, their

attitudes about reading the material seemed to be noticeably
affected by the different choice conditions.

Third, the low

scores on the comprehension test suggested that the reading
material was too difficult for the fifth-grade students.
The conclusions from the first pilot study suggested

that a similar procedure could be employed with either older
subjects or simpler reading material, if a satisfactory measure
of the subjects' attitudes toward the reading assignment could
be

developed.

A measure of attitude toward doing the reading

assignment would relate more directly to dissonance theory as
a

dependent variable than the measure of estimated difficulty

of the reading material.

Subjects who disliked doing the reading

assignment did not necessarily tend to see it as more difficult.
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TABLE 2

COMPREHENSION SCORES OBTAINED
FROM THE PILOT STUDY

..

___

-

- -

CHOICE GROUP

NO CHOICE GROUP

-·Subject

......

-----~

Raw

Subject
Number

Raw

Score

Nurnber

Score

1

3

ll

9

2

9

12

11

3

6

13

13

4

10

14

4

5

10

15

9

6

16

15

7

12
17

17

10

8

ll

18

ll

9

10

19

10

10

13

20

7

Mean:
S.D.:

-

10.l
3.59
,,,__,.

_

Mean:
S .D.:

_.....___._ .....,,..

9.9
2.86
,.
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Instrument Development
A two-part rating scale was designed to measure
attitudes toward the reading assignment.
two

The scale contained

items with five choices each, arranged on a Likert scale.

Both items were designed. to assess the subjects' degree of
liking or dislike for the assignment.

Scores on the two

items were summed to yield total scores from 2 to lO.

A

small trial run was made to test the effectiveness of this

instrwnent.

Six seventh grade boys were taken from their gym
classes and were given the story part of the Traxler High
School Reading Test.

Three of the subjects were given the

Choice instructions, and three subjects with matching
reading test scores were given the No Choice instructions.
They read the assignment and filled out the attitude rating
scale.

The materials used appear in Appendix B.
The subjects' responses are shown in Table 3.

There

was a good spread of chosen responses, suggesting that the
questions could discriminate variations in attitude.

The

attitude scores ranged from a score of 6 to a score of 10.

The

groups were far too small for this trial run to be considered a
pilot test of any hypotheses.

But the results suggested that

the attitude scale would be adequate as a measuring instrument for the purposes of the current study.

TABLE 3

RESPONSES TO THE ATTITUDE Pi.ATIMG SCALE

Choice Group
Subject

Hollister Benson Fehring Cohen Holste Labahn

Question IJ l

4

Question II 2

...L
7

Attitude Score

No Choice Group

5

J

3

...l...

....L

-L

...l...

6

10

6

6

CHAPTER VI

EXPERIMKNTAL PROCEDURE
De-v-elopment of Research Hypotheses
In the current study) the subjects were taken from

their swimming classes to be given a reading assignment under

varied experimental conditions.

Following the reading, they

completed the attitude rating scale and a test of their comprehension of the reading material.

The two dependent variables

assessed were the subjects' attitudes about doing the reading

assignment, and their comprehension of the assignment.

The subjects were divided into four groups to be
called Choice-Incentive, Choice-No Incentive, No ChoiceIncentive, and No Choice-No Incentive.

These four groups

represented every possible combination of the two independent
variables.

Choice and No Choice represented whether or not

the subjects were given an opportunity to choose not to do
the assignment.

Incentive and No Incentive represented

whether or not the subjects were promised course credit for
doing the assignment.
It was expected that subjects in the Choice-No

Incentive condition would experience cognitive dissonance.
The perception that they have had a choice would be dissonant
with the perception that they would have preferred to go to
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swimming class.

This dissonance would be a drive stimulus

£or these subjects to change their attitude toward the reading
assignment.

They -W"Ould tend to see the assignment as more

desirable, and ·thus reduce the dissonance.

Therefore, in

the absence of incentive, it was expected that the Choice
group would show a more positive attitude toward the reading
assignment than the No Choice group.
Subjects in the No Choice-No Incentive group would
not experience dissonance about complying with a relatively
undesirable activity.

Since they were given no choice, they

would not have a cognition that they had chosen to do the
task.

They would not be motivated to enhance the desirability

of the reading task.

Thus, in the absence of incentive,

their attitude toward the reading assigrunent would be more
negative than that of the Choice-No Incentive group.

These

predictions were strongly suggested by the literature.
Predictions concerning the subjects who were given
the incentive were more tenuous.

Research data were not

available to show whether "class credit" would be consistently
as effective an incentive as monetary rewards have been.

The

research hypotheses assumed that the effects 0£ class credit
upon attitude change would be equivalent to the effects of
monetary rewards.
Half of the subjects were told that they would
receive class credit for doing the reading assignment.

Thia
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incentive should have reduced the dissonance of the subjects
in the Choice condition because it provided justification
for choosing to comply with the relatively undesirable
reading activity.

Thus subjects in the Choice-Incentive

condition should not have been

~otivated

to enhance their

perception of the desirability of the reading assignment as
much as subjects in the Choice-No Incentive group.
Subjects who were given the incentive and were
given no choice should have had more positive attitudes
toward the reading assignment than subjects who were given
no choice or incentive, simply because there was more to be
gained from the reading assignment in the No Choice-Incentive
condition than in the No Choice-No Incentive condition.

It

followed that a significant interaction was expected between
Choice and Incentive conditions on the measure of attitude.

No significant main effects were predicted.

If prow.ising

class credit were not equivalent to monetary rewards as an
incentive, a different pattern of effects would be obtained.
The incentive variable would have no affect upon subsequent
attitudes toward the reading assignment.

There would be no

significant main effect of the incentive variable and no
significant interaction.

However, there would. be a significant

main effect of the choice variable.

Both groups of subjects

in the Choice condition would have been expected to show
more positive att.itudes toward the reading assignment than

~fo

both grcups cf subjects in the

Choice condition.

The measure of per:forr:u1nce ·was the subjects• scores on

a test of their
presenc~

co~prehension

of the reading assignment.

The

or absence of dissonance relative to doing the assign-

n;ent does not carry direct implications regarding perforrnance.
Thus, the Choice conditions were not expected to affect perform.a.nee on the reading task.
If promising class credit for doin,<".'. the reading assign-

ment. were an ef.fective incentive, then by definiti.on, the
incentive would rnot.iva.te the subjects to perform better.

Thus

the subjects in the Incentive groups were expected to do better
on the perforrnance !·1e8.sure than

sub.~ects

in. the No Incentive

groups.

The hypotheses fnr the two analyses follow.

They are

baaed upon the above rationale.
Students who choose to do a. reading assignment and students who are not given a choice
will net differ sienificantly in their
attitudes toward doing that assignment.

Students who are promised course credit for

doing a reading assignment and students who

are not promised course credit will not differ
sientfica.ntl;:r in
that assignn1ent.

the~.r

attitudes toward doing

There will be a significant interaction

hetw·een choice and course credit conditions in
their eff ecta upon subsequent attitudes toward
doing the reading assignment.
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Students who choose to do a reading a.ssig."1-

ment and students who are not given a choice
will not;; differ significantly in t~heir
comprehension of that reading material,
Students 'Who are promised course credit for
doing a reading assignment will co1.:i.prehend

that reading assign.~ent significantly better
than students who are not promised course credit.
'Xhere will be no significant int.eraction between
choice and course credit conditions in their
efiects upon subsequent. cOLlprehension of that
reading material.
Subjects

The subjects for this study were eighty boys in the
seventh and eighth p;rades at a suburban junior high sehool.

Only

boys who had scored !'rorn the thirtieth to the ninetieth percen-

tiles on the Reading Comprehension section of the Iowa Test of
Basic Skills were included in the sampling population.
one

or

Because

the dependent variables was a reading comprehension

measure, it was desirable to avoid large variances in reading
comprehension skill.

The greater the

~~thin-group

variability

due to differences in skill, the greater would l>e the error

variance in the analysis.

Generalizations from this study would

apply to students within the mid-range of reading skill.
The subjects

w~re

groups on a random basis.

a"'isigned to the four experimental
Three groups had ten seventh graders

and ten eighth graders, an0 one group had nine seventh and eleven
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eighth graders.

It wa0 assur.ted that the pre-experimental attituda!!

of students id.thin the mid-range of reading skill were relatively
homogeneous, and that random assignment assured that between-group
variations in attitudes

~rould

be due solely to chance.

Instruments
The reading assignment was the Story Comprehension
section ot the Traxler Silent Reading Test, Form l (Traxler, 1934)
The story was reproduced so that the assignment would not look
like a test.

The attitude scale developed for this study was

printed at the end of the story.
Ten comprehension questions i-mich were part of the test
were reproduced separately.

They were given to the subjects after

they had read the story and completed the attitude measure.
the comprehension questions would not affect the subjects'
~ttitude

The materials used appear in Appendix

ratings.

c.

Experimental Design and Method
The study followed a 2 x 2 factorial design which
provides for two experimental variables.

The two variables,

choice and incentive, were independently assigned to four experimental groups.
The subjects were taken from their swimming classes

Thus,
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in snall groups during a one-week period.

The experimental

instructions were read to them when they arrived at the

experimenter's room.

These instructions varied according to

experimental condition as follows:

I have asked you here to do a reading assignment. This (hold up reading material) is the
story that I want you to read. After you
have finished the story there will be questions for you to answer about it.
(Incentive conditions only) I w.lll give the
resu1ts ·to your language arts teacher so that
you will get credit for the assignment.

(Choice condition only) Mow I don't want
anyone to feel that he has been £creed to
do this. If you want, I will make out a

pass so that you can go back to gyn class.
Pleaae write
your name on the front and read it at your
own pace. At the end of the story you wi.ll
find two questions. When you have answered
them) give me back the story and I will give
you some other questions to answer. Are
Now I'll pass out the story.

there any questions about ·what. you are to do?

The Choice condition allowed st.udents to not parti-

cipate, and twenty-tWt) students chose to retv.rn to their
swimming classes.

Percentile scores from the Reading Compre-

hension section of the Iowa. Tests of Basic Skills were
available on a.11 of the subjects.

Fer.ms and sta.~dard deviations

were calcu1ated fror:; these data in order to deterr:rl.nc that

the four ex:perin1ental groups were si1:lilar in readinG comprehension skill.

TablB I+ shcn::s these data.

The means ranged
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TABLE

I'::.EANS AND

OF

READil~G

i+

STANDJIF\~

TEST

DEVIATIONS

PERCEl~TILE

SCORES

FOR THE FOUH EXPEnihENTAL GROUPS

==========:::::::==========================================::1

:=~=-

Incentive

No Incentive

Total

CHOICE

NO CHOICE

Mean• 59.30

Mean • '57.55

Mean = 58.42

s.n. -

S .D. == 20.2g

S.D.

= 55.70
S.D. = 18.29

Itiean

20.25

Iviean = 54.25
S.D.

= 20.48

Mean

TOTAL

S.D.

D

19.76

= ;4. 98
= lct.9)

Mean ... 56.78

Mean

= 56.62

Mean = 56.70

S.D. = 20.01

s.n. - is.g4

S.D. = 19.20

53.
from 54.25 to 59.30.

It may be noted that the mean scores for

subjects in the Choice {;Toups were very close to the mean
scores of the subjects in the No Choice groups.

Thus, there

uas no tendency to C.e left with better readers in the Choice
groups due to poorer readers choosing not to participate.
Except for the instructions given, all of the experimental groups were treated alike.
passed out.

The reading assignment was

The subjects read the story and filled out the

attitude scale.

The experimenter checked to see that the

subjects' names were on their papers and that the attitude
scales had been filled out before giving
comprehension questions to answer.
fully cooperative.

tha~

the sheet of

All of the subjects were

The attitude rating scale and the compre-

hension questions were scored, and these raw scores were the
measures of attitude a.nd performance used in the analysis.
Analysis
The

ti10

dependent variables were the subjects'

attitude scorss and their comprehension scores.

A two-way

analysis of variance with fixed effects was calculated from
each set of da.ta..

The calculations were done in the manner

prescribed by Guilford (1956, p. 296).
Three relations..'1ips were tested with each of the two

dependent variables.

(1) There ri:tc:1:..c havs been a significant

main effect relationship between Choice conditions and the
dependent variable.

(2)

There might have been a significant

main effect relationship between Incentive conditions and the
dependent variable.

(3)

There might have been a significant

interaction between the Choice and Incentive conditions.

A

criterion probability level ot .05 was selected for determining
whether a relationship was significant.
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CHAPTER VII
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Analysis ot Attitude Data
The first three hypotheses predicted the efi'ects of
Choice and Incentive variables upon the subsequent attitudes

ot the subjects toward doing the reading assignment.

They

predicted no significant main effects, but that a significant
interaction between the two independent variables would be
obtained.
Figure l displays the distributions ot attitude

scores obtained from the tour experimental groups.
scores indicated more favorable attitudes.

The higher

Table 5 shows

the means and standard deviations tor the tour groups based
upon the same data.

The mean attitude

scor~

the Choice-Incentive group was the highest.

or 1.00 tor
The mean

attitude score tor the Choice-No Incentive group was 6.30.
The mean score for the No Choice-Incentive group was 5.75,
and the mean score for the No Choice-No Incentive group was

;.25.
Table 6 shows the

summary

table for the analysis of

variance calculated from the attitude scores.

The predicted

interaction effect was not obtained, nor was there a significant Incentive main effect.

However, there was a highly
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TABLE 5

KEANS AND STAflIDARD DEVIATIONS OF
ATTITUDE SCORES FOR THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS

CHOICE
Incentive

NO CHOICE

_,

7.00

Mean == ;.7;

Mean

S.D. == 1.00

S.D. == 1.79

S.D. = l.;;

Mean==

-

No Incentive

Total

---·

TOTAL

Mean=

6.)0

S.D. = 1.76

--

Mean

= ;.2;

___

S.D. = 1.45
____ ___
........

....

Mean= 6.65

Mean =

S.D. = 1.44

S.D. =

5.;o
1.61

Mean

==

6.38

= ;.78

S.D. = 1.64

_...

Mean == 6.08

S.D. == 1.62

5a.
significant main effect of the Choice variable (F

I?.< .Ol).

= 11.8456;

Thus, the subjects who were given a choice had

significantly more favorable attitudes toward the reading
assignment than did the subjects who were not given a choice.
The relationships predicted by the first three
experimental hypotheses were not confirmed.

There was evidence

of dissonance-mediated attitude change due to the Choice
variable, but the Incentive variable had no significant
effects upon attitude.

Thus, both the Incentive and the

No Incentive groups followed the pattern predicted for the
No

Incentive groups.

The results were consistent with the

relationships that were predicted if the promise of class
credit were not an effective incentive (See page 47).
Analysis of Performance Data
The last three hypotheses predicted the eff ecta of

Choice and Incentive variables upon the subsequent comprehension of the reading assignment.

They predicted that there

would be a significant main effect ot the Incentive variable,
but there would be no significant main effect of the Choice
variable and no significant interaction.
Figure 2 displays the distributions of raw scores
for comprehension obtained from the four experimental groups.
The higher scores indicated greater knowledge of what had
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TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
SUivTMARY

TABLE

BASED ON ATTITUDE SCORES

·Source

Sum of
Squares

Degrees of
Freedom

Mean

Square

F

-

-26.45

l

26.4500

11.8456*

Incentive

7.20

l

7.2000

J.2245

Interaction

0.10

l

0.1000

0.0448

Within Sets 169.70

76

2.2329

203.55

79

Choice

Total

-

•

.... ~.

h?. <.Ol)

-~
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been read.

Table 7 shows means and standard deviations for

the four groups based upon the same data.

The Choice-Incentive

group obtained the :tighest mean comprehension score of 6. 65.
The other three groups were very similar with means of 5.15
for the Choice-No Incentive group, ;.2; tor the No ChoiceIncentive group, and 5.55 for the No Choice-No Incentive
group.

Table 8 shows the summary table for the analysis of
variance calculated from the comprehension scores.

No

significant relationships were found, including the predicted
main effect for the Incentive variable.

Thus, the relation-

ships predicted by the last three experimental hypotheses
were not confirmed.
Conclusions
The six experimental hypotheses were developed with
the assumption that the promise of course credit would have
, an incentive effect similar to that of monetary reward.
This assumption was necessary because experimental evidence
had not yet demonstrated that "course credit" was equivalent
to monetary reward in its affects upon attitude and performance.

Failure to confirm the fifth experimental

hypothesis indicated that "course credit" did not significantly
affect perfor.mance.

The mean comprehension scores shown in
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TABLE 7
MEAH3 AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF
cor,'fPREHENSION PERFOPJMI::CE SCOH.ES FOR THE
FOUR EXPERIV!ENTAL GROUPS

-CHOICE

---------~------·-----~-_

Incentive

No Incentive

________

NO CHOICE
.

......,....

Mean == 6.6S

Mean

= ;.2;

Mean

= 5.9;

S.D. = 2 .. 16

S .D. == 2.33

S.D.

2.30

l<Iean ==

5.3;

l•lean

= 5.15

l<flear;. •

5.55

S.D. = 2.32
= 2.14
-------...--- -·-,.. ------·-'_,..________ _______

S.D.

,,,_,,

Total

_. ____,..

'.:L10TAL
_,

Mean= ;.90

Mean = 5.40

s.n.

S.D.

= 2.23

~--..,.------------...--

...

·-·

= 2.27

··----~"

-·--

S .D.

= 2.14

~-·---·,-·,,--,·~··-,.-,._

JViean

= 5.6;

S.D. == 2.24

-··--------------
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TABLE 8
ANALYSIS OF VARIAf.YCE
S U':>11iARY TAJL:S

BASED OU COH.PREHENSION SCORF.S

____
Source

__....-.-.__......... """'

Sum 0£

Squares

.,.,,.,,",

.

Degrees of
Freedom

-

Mear.'1.

Squares

F

Choice

;.oo

l

s.oooo

l.0;03

Incentive

7.20

1

7.2000

l.5124

;.40;0

Interaction

16.20

l

16.2000

Within Sets

361.00

76

4.7605

Total

390.20
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Table 6 did not even suggest an incentive effect.

Thus it

may be concluded that the promise of class credit "Was not an

effective incentive.
It was predicted on page 47 that 1£ offering

"course credittt were not equivalent to a monetary incentive,

only the main effect of the Choice variable upon attitude
scores would be significant.
analysis .fowid.

This relationship is what the

Because "course credit" was not an effective

incentive, it had no effect either as a main effect or as
an interaction effect in combination with the Choice variable.
It follows that the interaction predicted by the third hypo-

thesis was not obtained.
The dissonance effect of the Choice variable upon
attitude was obtained as a main effect of the Choice variable.
Subjects who were given a choice in the matter of doing a
reading

assign.~ent

had a significantly more positive attitude

toward doing that assignment than subjects who were not
given a choice.

This finding probably has practical signifi-

cance as well as statistical significance.

The effects of

the Choice variable may be better seen by ignoring the
insignificant Incentive variable and looking at the data
divided into only two groups, Choice and No Choice.

Only six

subjects in the Choice groups gave negative attitude rating
scores of four or less to the assignment, while 34 gave
positive attitude rating scores of five or

hi~;her.

In the No

Choice groups, 25 subjects gave negative attitude rating scorea,
while only 15 gave positive attitude rating scores.
data are presented in Table 9.

These

Such a large difference in

the number of subjects with negative attitudes toward doing
an assignment suggests that the Choice variable has practical
significance for attitude changes in the

classroo~.
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TABLE 9
FREQUJ£UC IES OF POSITIVE AND NEQA TIVE
ATTITUDE SCORES,:t FROM ALL SUBJECTS
DJ THE CHOICE AJID UO CHOICE GROUPS

GROUPS

POSITIVE SCORES

1------·----------·-..-·---·

NEGATrvE SCORES

-------·-~-

. ---------.

Choice

)4

6

Uo Choice

15

25

*Attitude rating scores of 4 or lower were considered
to be negative, and rating scores of S or higher were considered

to be positive.
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CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION
Theoretical Implications
According to the theory ot cognitive dissonance,
individueis who choose to do a relatively undesirable task will
experience cognitive dissonance and will tend to reduce their
dissonance by enhancing their attitudes toward the taak.
results

or

dissonance.

The

the current study supported the theory ot cognitive
Students who chose to comply with the experimenter's

assignment experienced cognitive dissonance.

Their knowledge

that they had chosen to do the reading assignment was dissonant
with their feeling that they would have preferred going to
swimming class.

This dissonance was a drive stimulus which

motivated these subjects to reduce their levels
by

or

dissonance

changing their attitudes about the relative desirability of

doing the reading assignment as compared to going to swimming
class.

Dissonance reduction may have been evidenced by the

adoption of a more positive attitude toward doing the reading
assignment and/or by the adoption of a more negative attitude
toward going to

swim.~ine

dissonance reduction

w~.s

clasc.

Since only the former mode of

of interest in this study. only the

subsequent attitudes of the students toward doing the reading

assignment were assessed.

'!'he attitudes

or

the students who were
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given a choice were found to be more positive than the attitudes
of those who were not given a choice.
Those students who were not given a choice as to
whether to comply with the experimenter's a$s1gnment did not
experience the dissonance created by the Choice condition.
They did not choose to do a reading assigruner.lt which was contrary
to their attitudes of preference for going to sw.tmming class.
Thus, they were not motivated to a1'lllance their attitudes toward

the assignment.

Their assessed attitudes were round to be less

positive than the attitudes of the students uho were given a
choice.
Choice conditions affect the presence or absence of
cognitive dissonance, but incentive conditions are not an
integral part of dissonance theory.

Incentive conditions are

only important in that they affect the relative attractiveness
oi the choice alternatives.

For example, if the subjects in

the current study had been offered $10 for doine; the 1•eading
assignment, doing the assigru:i-:;rrt :uight have been more desirable

than going to swimming class.

Therefore, subjects who chose

to do the reading assignment would not have experienced cognitive
dissonanee resulting i':com choosin;; a rolat1'raly undesirable
alternative.
In the current study, the incentive

promise of course credit.

er~1ployed

was a

The fact that this incentive had no

significant effects upon eithc:i: uttitude or performance suggests
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that promising course credit is not equivalent to promising a
monetary reward.

The results showed that the promise of course

credit did not significantly affect the relative attractiveness
of the reading assignment or the subjects' performance on that
assignment.

The theoretical implication o! this finding is

that one may not be able to corr-1pare studies emplo!ring one type

of incentive with studies employing another type 'Without
evidence that the two types

or

incentives are equivalent.

Experimental I1nplications
The procedure employed in the current study seemed to

provide an adequate test for the experimental hniotheses.

The

attitude rating scale appeared to be quite satisfactory for
assessing the students' attitudes toward doing the assig-rmient.
The experimental procedure successfully demonstrated an a,pproach

for testing dissonance-mediated attitude change in a practical

school

s1tu~tion.

T'ne failure to find incentive effects leads one to
question whether this failure may be due to

inadequacies.

inethodol<.~gical

The coffprehensieiri test see:-.·iec'! t.o be a satisfactory

instrument for assessing the sturlents' cor,.prehension, and it

was administered under good

testi~z

conditicns.

The reading

and test questions were designed specifically for seventh and
eighth grade stw:l.ontz, and the cm:-prehension scores obtained
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indicated that the questions were at an appropriate level of
difficulty.

A more powerful test may have been obtained either

by using a more homogeneous group in terms of reading ability
and thereby reducing the error variance, or by statistically
controlling for differences in reading ability by some procedure
such as a treatments x levels design.

However, the obtained

differences between the means of the Incentive and No Incentive
groups would not have approached significance even if the error
variance were reduced by half.

It does not seem likely that

the failure to find incentive effects can be attributed to a
lack of power in the statistical test.
The effectiveness of the incentive manipulation may
be questioned.

Perhaps incentive effects would have been

obtained if the promise of course credit had been made in
some other way.

Several of the students asked their language

arts teachers about their scores after the study.

So there

was at least some understanding of and interest in the promised
course credit.

The most likely reason for failing to £ind

incentive effects seems to be that the promise of course credit
is not an effective incentive in terms of the kinds of attitudes
and performance assessed in this study.
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Practical Implications
This study

der;~onstrat.ed

in a practical school satti..-,,g.

coe;nitive dissona.J.ce e.rrects

It wa.s a beginning step toward

realizing the practical value of

dissonan~e

theory.

Perhaps

the implications o! dissonance theory may be applied a little
more confidently to the practical school situation in the
future.
One itiplication of these findings tor the teacher
would be that students' attitudes may be enhanced by giving

them more options or choices.

Students who are allowed to

choose their assignments will have more positive attitudes
toward doing those assignments and toward school.

This imp1i-

cation is consistent with the current trend

allowing

to~ard

students to participate in determining what their educational
experiences shall be.

Thia trend should help to improve the

affective outcomes obtained by schoolst and it should be
encouraged.
Another implication ot the .findings would be that
there may be more effective incentives

the so frequently used
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em.ploy other incentives.

coursc credit. 0

tor cla.saroom use than
The teacher should

Course credit .may be a useful book-

keeping practice, but if it does not a.ff ect the students'
performance, the practice of attemptirig to motivate students by

offering course credit must be questioned.
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Educational psychologists have lieen e.tte11.:ptir..g to bring

a variety of incentives hack into the classroom.

It ie

generally accepted that the most 1f,1portant kind of ineent1ve ia

social.

Soc:!.al incentives are essentie1 for socialization or

the child, and they promote learning to work together.

They

should be employed fl:•equently, e.11d they should be available
to all, regardless

Some extL-n.ples are

or

the individual.ts level

soei~l

or

attain..~ent.

recognition, 1xraise, positive feedback,

a smile, or a .frier..dly touch.
In addition to the social reinforeers, teachers may
For example, the child may be

employ more concrete incentives.

given checks on a record sheet, stars, tokens, or trEtding $tll'IP••
Such incentives are frequently used in eonju.netion with "pertor·

mance contractstt in Which the child and teacher agree upon a

Conciete
incentives may also be employed in order to eliminate undesitfable
given reward for completion of a speeitied a$s1a;nment.

behavior as in "behavior moditieation" prog:rarns.

The teacher·

and child agree that for each specified period that the child

does not display the undesirable behavio1", a SFecified reward

will be given.

Skillful use or such "token" incentives can

have a strong impact upon childrer.' s behavior.

Frequently, in order to make the "token" incentive•
valuable to the childi the tokens
buy eomething or value to him.

~ey

be used by the child to

For example, a given number ot

earned tokens may be traded in tc the teacher tor a toy, some

?'J.
candy, or food item, or a period of "free play."

Small rewards

such as candy corn or M & M candies are also used in more
restricted settings with children.

Such direct, continuous

reinforcement has not been demonstrated as a practical or
desirable procedure for general classroom use.

However, it ia

apparent that a wide variety of incentives are available, and
teachers should make more effective use of them.
Suggestions tor Further Research
The current study has verified the proposed relationship

between a choice given to students and the students' subsequent
attitudes.

Educators could benefit from further study of the

relationship between choice and attitude change.

Similar studies

may be done employing various kinds of choices in a variety of
academic situations.

Only with repeated study in a variety of

situations will it be possible to establish the limits within
which this relationship holds.

There may even be some situa-

tions in 'Which an inverse relationship between choice and
attitude change will be found.

Such an inverse relationship

has been found under given laboratory conditions (Linder,
Cooper, and Jones, 1967; Holmes and Strickland, 1970; Sherman,
1970).

A different approach to studying the relationship
between choice and attitude change would be possible if an

74.
instrument were developed to measure the amount of choice that
a teacher provides.

With such an instrument, a study could be

made of the relationship between the amount of choice available
in classrooms and the attitudes of the students in those classrooms.

Developmental patterns might also be described.

There

may be some optimal alllount of freedom of choice for each grade
level.
The current study failed to obtain significant effects
from the "course credit" incentive..

The promise of course

credit did not significantly affect students in terms of the
two dependent variables.

.

This surprising result suggests that

the effectiveness of commonly used classroom incentives should
be evaluated.

lducators are aware that masses of students are

disinterested in classroom learning.

Part of the solution to

this problem is the effective use of incentives that make
learning activities more interesting and satisfying.
Finally, it would be very interesting to repeat the
current study with monetary rewards for the incentive.

The

failure to verify hypotheses three and five has been attributed
to ineffectiveness of the "course credit" incentive as compared
to monetary reward.

This explanation of the negative results

would be continued if the hypothesized relationships were found
using a monetary reward.
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APPENDIX A

:MATERIALS USED IN THE PILOT STUDY
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Name_,.,..,.,.,,==============-

88.
Directiou:. Place the number ot the word or phrase which should complete e
tibe tollowinff eentem:e in the blanks before tbe numbers ot the seratemes.

h ot

Example :

3

Thia is a teat in (l) ar1tllmet1c (2) epellil!B (3) read.15 (4) geography.

_ __ ......1.

People in the Old Stone Age ( 1) did not know bow to write or drav
(2) made crude drav11J8a (3) had a crude alphabet (4) left ·mazq written

records.
2.
----

Simple picture vr1t1DB began perhaps (1) 3,000 1ears ago (2) 10,000
years ago (3) 100,000 years 880 (4) l,000,000 years aao.

3.
---....-

Thia st ory states that pictures ot ar:U.mal.a made thousands of y ars 86<>
have been found 1D a cave in Cl ) Spain (2) .Ezaal&Dd. (3) Americ
(4) Africa •

...__ _ _4. llieroalyphic writ ing (l) is

tbe l east ad:van:ed stage ot vritins
( 2 ) ia the same aa picture writins (3 ) grew out of picture vritins
(4) uses u alphabet.

5. When

------·

the white man came t o America the India.ne (l) could not write
at all (2) uH<\ picture vri ia.g (3) used syllable writing (4) had a
crude alphabet.

----

t t about b1eros}¥phic vrit1ns is that <1> it 1• cut
in at one (2) 1t can. be read veey easily (3) it 1• th most ancient
wr1t.1q (4) it is made up or recognizable picturee.

_
1.
----

Cuneiform vrii11?8 was made on (l) bricks (2) atone (3) papyrus
(4) tree bark.

6.

'l'be outstencU.118

_ _ _ _8. Sip or pict ure a used to express ideas not related in a direct and
natural way to the pictures are called (1) pictographs (2) alphabet1e
writi11.g (3) ideosraphs (4) inscript ions.

·---9·

People be~ to discard pictograph vriti.Da when they (1) began 11"11136
i n caves (2) began to make records on papyrus (3) came to settle in
vilJ.ases and t owns (4) decided to invent an,alpbabet.

10 .
----

Syllable writ iog is (1) more advanted than writ1118' with ideographs
(2) less advanced tbaD Wl'it1Dg With ideOll'&phs (3) about as advanf:ed
a11 a.l.pbabet1c vrit1D.S (4 ) less advanced than pictographic vrit1Di.

_ _ _ _u.

Syl 3bl writing is uaed toda.J in (l) India (2 ) Ruaaia (3) Arabi
(4) China.
·
.

_ _ _ _12. •

~

alphabet wa invented by the (1) Seiritee (2) Egyptians
(3) Phoenicians (4) Babylonians.

_ _ _ _13.

The t1ret alphabet c ou1sted ot ( l ) consocants and vowels {2 ) con•

89.

aoaaDt• (3 ) Yowels (4) pictographa.
_ _ _ _1~4.

_ _ __.15.

The S iritea (1) conquered tbe Rgyptians (2) vere conquered b)' the
EaPt ians ( 3 ) were desceDdanta ot the Egyptians (4) were employed
b;y the El)"ptiana .

'1'he alphabet was probab~ illvent.ed 111 connection with (1) the report.a

ot generala about their Yictories in war (2) the writings ot ancient
scholars (3) the reports ot roremen about their work (4) the 1nscr1pt1ona on the tombs ot k1Dsa.

____16. The ,people who invented the alphabet left the region 1n which they
11-nd and took tboir alphabet to other parts ot the world because
(1) tbeJ vere driwn out (2) tbe mi.nee 111 which the;y worked were
closed (3) the7 were nomada who did not lik to stay in one plac;e
ver, long (4) the pastures tor their flocks were used up.

_ _ _ _17.

Traders vho did a great deal to spread the alphabet to Europe were
the (1) PhoeDicianB (2) Aramaeane (3~ Hebrews (4) Greeks.

----

The t1rat people to
the alphabet tor more important writiq than
business .records and tombstone 1Decr1pt1ona were the l ) Seiriwe
(2) ArM!8RDB (3 ) Bebreva (4) Greeks.

18.

uae

19. The Creeks (1) Paaaed the alpbabe't on

to the La~ina

uncbang 4

----

(2) a1mpl1t1ed it (3) improved it (4) completeq revi~ed i t.

20.
- ---

For the art ot vr1t1DS ve are 1Ddebtecl to (1) a small group ot men
(2) scholars (3) one nation (4) llllu..Y ditterent peoples.
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:tsJ pe:rhaps ,

110.n ~ s

most impor ta nt t ool_, but
wi.~l

possible that s ome one now in s r:ho l

c:: ~ e J. len i;

It

:;houch i t i s, i i:. i s

so· iC clay f' l ud

8.

wu·· t o :l prov · i t

still furt her.

Please arn:mer t.te :follm7inz qu.;.:s t.fon" by c i:tcl1.ng t.he number of' the i.·o

-r-c <~~.,

answer .

How d.if:f'icul t do you t hink t his r eading is f 0::.~ a f lfth g::at1e .1 ss?

1.

More s 'mple t hen average

2.

Averag'':

3. A l.:i.tt:i.e ttor.e d:Lf'firult,

T

h.

'f.~1;.r;L. more d.i. ffic lt

5.

So

d if':~:i.r;;ult

"''h:i.ch o:f the fellowing

most l'.'kely

2.

b~

'vcrn ,e

han .:ivc:::.·aGC

tho.t, mn :y
st.ud.~nt.s

i-.l~an

~muld

no·r. underst.ri. nd i"'· .

wculd ::eo.ding of

assigne d?

Sunier· hig!1 school r.tuG.en-.. s

3 . m.gh s

~hool Fr·~shrec::u

l~ .

Figh s d1ool

5.

CoDlegc. stuci.ent.s

ai.d Sophomores

·un:Lors ond Senio:i:·s

~:Y

s lcv'<:'l o:t' d:1.ffi c.ul +y

r

'IJ.

APPENDIX C

MATERIALS USED IN THIS STUDY

---·-··...--.

~----

98 .
WlfUOK AND HER CJB

·h:roat from t ime '!Po

1.he surf'e:ce of' tJ:ie

ill'~,

S:

r. ii

l;•1::t.'ll.~ -or~·

ad beer:. more -tnan a

_ay

si~£! "'

moon.

I •"". I

a.

~·1sk

ox · -? ·'O..
sb · p.

99.
~he

bt;-ar

~:ea "ht"''i tm~m:

she ..:as

on. ron::· d by 3!n n11b:roke-:1

;ir~lP

of ::ib...·1.rp ;"' t"vr•d

tO~"IlS.

".; reuibling caJ..vee

c

llind ·\Jlem, and evei·yt-1h .. re their f'ront :rerm.inad untroken.

or ur1ce 1;,he !:-ear rus1'ed fo1-vai· ~, as if int.en.ding to
~.onseque.

gle.n~e,

~berg

i

01:>s;;:!'

api: A of all

ices, on

ehe

lux"'i~d

away, fo.Utoved by her :u"b, i

see.1::.b. of easier pr l •

·n1sa.ppolnted by th'? m1JSk o·{e , the baar r.ieer d into
.!'llllf'..y es she moved

l?he.re 1;.'!le hlar.k

'i"'l.li. ll'aS · n old

e~rosa

wt~1

th'" frozen

1:-tildern~es

J..1

prmrde.

il"

Her ... o ~u-s~

huri:tlnf! for foOO..

;..losic· to the ehoro bad ..egun to sk m o er in

111 -wilo weighed. al· of

nook

ev~;;.-y

·~

H had · di! gy,

. oJ.d.

r.; -i.' "'

100 .
W:tr:.h.o·

htu1'1 ress r·erM:hed

.her

ble.~k

~

...:. so;lnd.,

i~'l:le

~:.he

whi" e bioar diaappoarerJ.

ellore at, a poin

ll!'lssle shOlrin;J a

O\"~

~r 1:~

du'•k ll:ke e.

t_~bos·~

hid'1.en by lwaped masses of ii&e .from ,_. e

Wt.en at

the s rf" e.

las~

she

re~hed

a p io:',,, in

·.-a a shadow.

air with his sensitive nostrils and

·pen aea which h

hsd just

t.ave bei:>n made by floctin

le~.

~ ... e.

:r-.-a.~y e{;

Sudd.eilly

tlle first. ;:;igh.t, eound , or

hio keen ea.rs

llow ver, the

r;1o~to

Wherefore, this one, at "•he f'iT.st sl gh

water.

of

aught. the sonna of

of :hi:? wb

souud

S' .en"

oo.. 1n.d.

Few land an:tmale, ind.,,oo, vo...U.d dare the '1.eptht:i t.rith

seal

is~

"Make>

hi:m, smmg a.ro.u.nd,

s~b.

a svimMr.

101.

a feast; of :ri h, p•n"e J l

Jf~ -g:i.vir:g

3~

1 mH;her liked.

1.t

:!

.U.k~~

reading

r
i•'-

~·~

eeal w.ca ';.

tU.~Uki:-d rs.:·::ub~g

.

5

.,, liked. re-dilr,g H. very

1.

I

2.

T. li'0 1lci. pret'!'r

..'.:t,.

! ·1·muld Ot,

~

!;.

'WO\ild.

r

ill:e

~",O

r

I WC'\ild like

~o

:>~

lb~-:·.:...

~;o

~.u

1t.

~lll:'e' •

l ~

~1Ci!ll

l!:U.\!h.

be otrori:g y op osed t.O>

1

d.1. i ...

do

it.

1~

,erv

~;.~b

r.:'f ?"f! :l~.

Di rec f j oua ·

.Plu .... e t ne rim· •er of rl;c wo1·d. -:>r phrao,.. \Hll ;11 snc!.l.ld. r.cmp1P- e eacn
of 1 he :; olloi-7 ng c:: :c cn'"es i1 ... lle bla ks before t11~ n..mci;r of

'·he senieires

Example:

______l .

___2 .

' he t:':uo Yhiml_)ercd. heca·;s• 'l} he 'l<.ras t:old 2) Le i;ro.s "'"ire1
(3) t.e was h rngry (4) he was lost. (5) h~. uas a 'raid. ·

•rhe f irst kill the bear ade wus (l) a r.;a.ir ol' r tffed gro· ,se
{2) a. pair of ;r'·armige.n {3) a white ra.bb•.t {ld a yo\mg deer
{5) a musk ox.
When ·o:he bear ca .•. ghi. sl({ . of the musk oxen sh .. (l. s ·opped and
wat-;hed. ~i;hem (2l n.tGhed at them at, on-:;e '3) e.p >roa.r-ted tllem
('QUtiously (4) ""ried o reep ap to them {5} nu.de a wi(le ce: o ,r
:;ro md them.

_ _ _4. 'As s oon s.s th y sau the bea.r, 'f'-he lit ·1e bulls (1)

~mng

her {2) ~"Usi d u , he?.' (3) s a.>.. ·eri.?d in ell dir? ... ions
c lo i be) le ing (5) deser·t '1 t.he cows
d. cal : 0 a.

-~---5·

(Id

o meet
e~

up

T..i:le b~ ar re rea · d frci:t the musk oxen as if in ter1·nr be aust•
ahe (l) ~s afraid of' ~r.e bulls (2) wan ;ed the 11 o think sn.. iiad gene mr~y .3) i:as an:d.O'.lS for thP- sc. e y or tie.
ub (. ) hol:'ed
to ~ p·i:rsued (5} vas t. P- ayf1J.l r.1000.

-ho bca1· 1 r·:· the musk ox herd, s!H~ :ovei (l} o·.it, "'pon
1,lle open pl11n (2) · owa.rcl a range of' men "'·.i:.i1rn (3l alo11g
r1il~r
(l!,) dow.n a rarrow gort;e (!"J :oward ille op1m sea .

iif' er

-

1.

When she ne"'rd. ,he inkle of. brea.ld.ng ice, the bear (1) o~hf'd
lo~• (2) ron •ow.rd t;he so
' (3) looked e.ll al: cu"". he!:' !;.) e:nif." tl

"the eir

(5) ;-

shed the cub to cafe :y.

__8.

As the b.:ar crc11t 'upon 1 he eec.l, he cu ( ) 1 ol1.mre1l 'be hlr·d rwr
{? s~.ood a. a dis anr.:e cmd wa1 ... hcd {3) ~2· ,. r-red euind some
<oe P~) whiurpered :l.n an.-ciety { 5) began t o hovJ •

-.......~...... _9.

The ·eal was pr.ep$:red i'or an at-'.a ··k from ~l, r. ny sidP {2) ~ nc
land. ('3} .h" open sen. (Id any d.i·c .t:lo P.X cp~ the south b) .. he
nor".;!, and -.. s •

-~--10 ..

lhen ~-he se· l ··rent do~n'l in o i·.he \m~ .r, th
.. o loo·~en h .. r g ip {2) sprar:g fter iiim (3
;:mv"h 'for her " I , i::anlt her -teeth deep-'l' 5 ·.·?
-r.ovEU'.'d him.

ou1i·~0d

s too
mmn

103.

APPENDIX D
RAW DATA

104.
RAW DATA FOR THE CHOICE-INCENTIVE GROUP
Name

Attitude
Score

Traxler
Raw
Score

Iowa
Percentile
Score

Ricky F.

7

9

46

s.

6

g

44

Roger T.

7

5

55

Ed

Joe

c.

7

5

69

Jon

w.

6

5

65

De.nnis H.

6

9

71

Jack M.

g

10

82

Steward M.

9

9

85

7
7

2

29

6

27

K.

9

5

)l

Mike N.

g

6

57

Tom M.

7

6

51

Steve C.

7

9

89

Mike W.

6

4

6)

Rich C.

6

6

35

Kevin L.

6

9

88

David R.

8

6

63

Jim P.

7

s

81

Ed T.

6

6

55

I~Iartin

B.

Brent B.
John

105.
RAW DAT.A. FOR 'l*HE NO CHOICE-NO IllJCENTIVE GROUP

Attitude

Name

Score

o.

Trwer

Raw

Score

.

lows.
Percentile
Score

3

4

2l

Roger 13.

7

s

42

Willie W.

6

44

Paul H.

s

Don D.

;

7
8
6
6
3

Don

G.

Bruce

o.

6
;

46

55
63

Jim Q.

.)

2

Ron H.

6

5

61
63
61

Terry G.

5
;

s

71

;

Dan R.

4

3

74
46

Ralph B.

5

3

59

Jim R.

4

9

Paul T.

7

8

51
67

Mike L.

9

9

71

Brian F.

4
4
;

9

82

4

26

3

'¥/

7

7

84

Jeff

Steve

w.

Mike C.

David
'l'om B.

s.

106.

RAW DATA FOR THE NO CHOICE-INCENTIVE GROUP

Name

Att1.tude

Score

w.

Tom

TraXJ.er

Raw
Score

Iowa
Percentile
Score

5

2

47

Wayne H.

5

3

53

Mike B.

7

7

55

Mike JC.

7

s

63

3

4

61

John L.

10

8

76

John E.

8

3

33

5

9

85

Jim M.

s

6

88

Marks.

6

3

21

lten P.

5

2

35

Martin L.

7

;

33

5

3

53

5

5

4

6

53
61

3

10

85

7

5

88

7

67

Bob S.

5
8

7

SS

Ralph B.

5

5

39

o.

Jim

Kevin

Mike

s.

c.

Steve B.
Jim

N.

Kent M.

Jim

c.

Steve N.

107.
RAH DATA FOE THE CHOICE-NO INCENTI'!E GROUP

Att!tuae

Name

frwer

?owa

Score

Raw
Score

Richard F.

g

4

26

Perry K.

9

2

33

s.

7

g

!<iike K.

4

6

67
67

Jetf M.

6

9

76

Bob C.

g

8

Bob N.

g

6

71
;7

Norm B.

4

5

61

Brett H.

6

7

63

7

3

59

Ji.in H.

g

22

Steve K.

7
7
7

5
6
7

Jim P.

;

4

57
71
76

George M.

7

;

29

Carry

2

Bob S.

5
;

Mike L.

2

5
6

31
;;

Greg K.

6

5

!~ark

Doug

w.

Bob C.

Tony

s.

J~.

2

Percentile
Score

22

55
87
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